Section 15.15. Construction of statutes with respect to culpability requirements

1. When the commission of an offense defined in this chapter, or  some
  element of an offense, requires a particular culpable mental state, such
  mental  state  is  ordinarily  designated  in  the  statute defining the
  offense by use of the terms "intentionally,"  "knowingly,"  "recklessly"
  or  "criminal  negligence,"  or by use of terms, such as "with intent to
  defraud" and "knowing it to be false," describing  a  specific  kind  of
  intent  or knowledge.   When one and only one of such terms appears in a
  statute defining an offense, it is presumed to apply to every element of
  the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.
    2. Although no culpable mental state  is  expressly  designated  in  a
  statute defining an offense, a culpable mental state may nevertheless be
  required  for the commission of such offense, or with respect to some or
  all  of  the  material  elements  thereof,  if  the  proscribed  conduct
  necessarily  involves  such  culpable mental state. A statute defining a
  crime, unless clearly indicating a legislative intent to  impose  strict
  liability,   should   be   construed  as  defining  a  crime  of  mental
  culpability. This subdivision applies to offenses defined  both  in  and
  outside this chapter.